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Abstract 
With the current Occupy Movement occurring on Wall Street and other parts of the globe, a 
lot of attention has recently been given to growing inequality and how much the top 1 percent of 
households have in terms of income versus the other 99 percent in the United States.  Mainstream 
economists and other social scientists point to greater trade liberalization, lower union membership, 
smaller government, greater GDP growth, a greater presence of the financial services industry in the 
economy, and lower marginal tax rates on upper income households as making significant 
contributions to growing income inequality and greater income shares for those at the top of the 
income scale in the United States.  Additionally, some mention that gains to upper income 
households have been made possible by a growing pay gap between skilled and unskilled or 
educated versus less educated workers, in which upper income households are made up 
disproportionately of college educated and highly trained individuals.  Finally, declines in the 
number of high paying jobs in manufacturing are also blamed for rising inequality and greater gains 
in income to top income households relative to those in other income groups.  All of these factors 
affecting inequality have been found to be statistically significant in one study or another.  This 
research note does not dispute the findings of other research efforts but explores the use of three 
other concepts to explain income inequality.  The use of 1) the profitability of the private sector, 2) 
the decline in the wages and salaries of most workers, and 3) the Marxian concept of rate of 
exploitation are offered as additional explanations of inequality and the income shares of top income 
households.   Since the Great Depression, it appears that the income shares of the top strata are due 
just as much to the income losses and “exploitation” of other groups and to governmental policies as 
they are due to the performance of the general US economy or to the performance of private sector 
profitability and returns on education.  These findings which offer support to both sides of the 
arguments over greater accumulation of income by those at the top of the income scale.   
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Introduction 
With the September 2011 Occupy Wall Street Movement spreading globally, issues 
regarding inequality in the US and in other parts of the globe have been gaining momentum in the 
news media, and public dialogue and discourse.  In fact, a recent PEW Center Research report found 
an increasing number of US citizens indicating an awareness of greater class conflict between rich 
and poor—47% indicating this in 2009 yet 66% indicating it in 2011 (Morin 2011).  Respondents to 
the PEW survey were about evenly split on the question of whether the rich have their wealth 
through “hard work, ambition or education” or, on the other hand, by being “born into wealthy 
families” or knowing the right people (Morin 2011).   
The cutoff for the income shares of those toward the top of the income scale depend upon 
whether capital gains are included or not (Saez 2009).  Without capital gains, the top 1 percent is 
estimated to have a family income of slightly less than $400,000 in 2007 according to Saez (2009) or 
to have a household income of $387,000 for 2010 according to Sentier Research (2012).  If capital 
gains are included, the thresholds are much higher.  According to Saez 
(http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez/ ), for 2008 and when capital gains income is included, the 
cutoff for the top 10, 5, 1, 0.5, 0.1 and 0.01 percent of households are around $261,951, 396,717, 
$1,137,684, $1,832,265, $5,658,768, and $27,342,212 respectively.   
 From where the top income and wealth strata in the US derive their success has been long 
studied and analyzed by various social scientists.   An upper strata of US citizens has probably 
always existed, but wealth concentration in the US probably did not become a public issue until the 
rise of big industrialists and robber barons during the Gilded Age around the second half of the 19
th
 
century (Hughes and Cain 1994).  In modern times, some account for income differences and high 
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earnings for those at the top by noting that higher earning households have higher levels of education 
than the general population (Freeman 2007; Miller, Benjamin, and North 2010).
1
  Others have noted 
that over the last 30 to 37 years top income groups have benefited more than other income groups 
from high growth rates in GDP and the growth of international trade (Dew-Becker and Gordon 
2005; Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom 2009); lower top marginal tax rates for individuals and 
corporations thanks to the ascendancy of neo-liberal policies in the late 1970s (Roine, Vlachos, and 
Waldenstrom 2009; Hacker and Pierson 2010); a smaller government presence in the economy with 
regard to trying to alleviate inequality (Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom 2009; Hacker and Pierson 
2010); the growth in the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate industries (FIRE) (Foster and Magdoff 
2009; Kotz 2003, 2008, 2009; Lapavitsas 2009; McNally 2009; Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom 
2009; Kotz and McDonough 2010; Tabb 2010a and 2010b) and the decline of high paying 
manufacturing employment and in labor union membership as well as the wages and salaries of 
other income groups, especially those in middle income groups (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; 
Freeman and Katz 1995; Gordon 1996; Birchfield and Crepaz 1998, Alderson and Nielsen 2002; 
Minnich 2003; Piketty and Saez 2006; Hacker and Pierson 2010).    
This paper adds three other variables to this list of factors influencing top income shares: net 
operating surplus as a percentage of GDP (a measure of business profitability); wages and salaries as 
a share of national income; and the Marxian concept of the rate of exploitation.  The variable net 
operating surplus as a percentage of GDP is used to predict top income shares.  In the course of 
                                                             
1 Freeman notes that those with college degrees in the US make more than those with a high school diploma or those 
without a high school diploma but also argues that the earning differences are due to more than the productivity 
differences in workers’ educational backgrounds.  He shows that in developed countries which have the same or 
greater portion of college graduates as the United States, the earnings differentials between college and non-college 
grads are not as great as those in the US.   This is across all types of degrees conferred.  Freeman believes that the 
earnings gap between US college grads and non-grads is so large relative to other developed nations because wages in 
the US are mostly set by market forces rather than by institutional arrangements (collective bargaining agreements, 
government regulation, etc.).   
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writing this paper, no research has been found where the variable has been used to predict an upper 
income share, and specifically the shares of those at the top since these income strata derive a greater 
share of their income from capital gains, dividends, and rents than other income groups 
(http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/)  .  Since some radical scholars and writers claim that top income 
shares are determined or influenced by a zero sum situation in which gains to the top come at the 
expense of wage earners and salaried employees, this paper uses the variable wages and salaries as a 
percentage of GDP as a predictor of the top income shares.   This variable has been used to predict 
overall income inequality in different nations (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998, Alderson and Nielsen 
2002) but never solely for the US and never solely for predicting top income shares.  Finally, only a 
handful of authors (Amsden 1981; Lambert 2011) have used the concept of the rate of exploitation to 
predict income inequality, and in the course of researching this paper, none has been found that uses 
it explicitly for the US or for the top shares of an income distribution. 
The rate of exploitation is based upon the concepts of surplus value and variable capital.  The 
notion of surplus value, or the amount of labor value extracted by the capitalist from the worker that 
is over and above what is necessary to sustain himself or herself, originated in Marx’s labor theory 
of value (Marx 1867) and has been used and debated extensively in economics ever since (Brue 
1994).  The rate of surplus value or the rate of labor exploitation (S’) has been expressed as the ratio 
of surplus value (S) divided by the value paid in wages, or variable capital (V):   
S’ = S / V                                                                                  (1) 
Measurements of national or macroeconomic surplus value and/or rates of surplus value 
include those developed by Baran and Sweezy (1966), Stanfield (1973), Shaikh and Tonak (1994), 
Wolff (1975, 1977, 1979, and 1987) and Zafirovski (2003) among many others.  Some of the 
measurements are used to analyze surplus value or rates of surplus value (or rates of exploitation) in 
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the US (Baran and Sweezy 1966, Stanfield 1973, Wolf 1979 and 1987, and Shaikh and Tonak 1994) 
whereas others are applied to other economies or used for cross country comparisons (Wolff 1975 
and 1977, Alberro-Semerena and Nieto-Ituarte 1986, Kalmans 1997, Zafirovski 2003 and Venida 
2007).   The latter studies use national input-output tables for calculations whereas others rely on 
intra-industry wage differentials, or the consumer price index and its hypothetical market basket of 
goods, to estimate the degree to which labor is exploited.  The most common types of calculations 
are those using the input-output tables, and these studies also make the distinction first used by Marx 
between labor that is productive and that which is unproductive.   Although this distinction is often 
debated as a to whether it is necessary in Marxian economic analysis (Becker 1977, Wolff 1987, 
Laibman 1999), one of the purposes of this paper is not to partake in the debate but rather to 
illustrate the usefulness of applying different measurements of surplus value.     
If private sector net operating surplus as a percentage of GDP is a positive and significant 
predictor of the income of the top shares, then those who claim that the success of the top, also seen 
as an investor and managerial class, is due to their business savvy and knowledge would find support 
for their arguments.
2
  Meanwhile, those who see gains to a top income group coming from lower and 
working classes via decreasing labor wages and salaries and greater rates of exploitation (higher 
GDP output coming from productive labor) would find their views supported if these variables are 
found to be linked to top income shares. 
                                                             
2 In doing calculations, it was found that the top 10, 5, 1, 0.5, 0.1, and 0.01 percent are moderately correlated (r = 0.56 to 
0.66) with estimates of wealth concentration in the US from the 1920s to 2007 using Domhoff’s estimates of wealth 
concentration (http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html).  Wealth is defined as household total assets 
minus total liabilities. Additionally, as of 2008, Saez’s website (http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/) on inequality and income 
shares shows that after excluding capital gains the top 10% derived around a quarter of its income from entrepreneurial 
income, interest, rents, and dividends; for the top 5% it was around 32%; for the top 1 percent it was around 45%; for the 
top 0.5% it was around 50%; for the top 0.1% it was around 57%; and for the top 0.01% it was around 64%.      
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This paper proceeds as follows.  The next section is a methods section describing what 
variables are to be used in the correlation and regression analyses.  After that, the results of 
descriptive statistics for the variables, an analysis of some graphs, and the results of the correlation 
analysis and regression analysis are discussed.  Finally, some concluding remarks are made that 
explore the implications of the paper’s analyses. 
Methods 
Given the preceding discussion of factors that can affect the top income shares of US 
households, least squares regression using time series data from 1929 to 2008 is used to predict an 
index
3
 of the  income shares as a percentage of GDP of the top 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.1% and 
0.01%, including capital gains income (Piketty and Saez 2003, updated 2010) using the following 
independent variables as predictors: 
1. Lag Top Income Shares for Top 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.1% and 0.01%, including capital 
gains income, Index.  Because the current state of a class’s income is dependent upon and 
related to its previous levels because of occupations, educational level, etc., income is 
characterized by hysteresis, and so the previous period’s income share is used to predict a 
current period’s income share (e.g., 1929 income shares are used to predict 1930 top 
income shares, 1930 is used to predict 1931, and so on and so forth).  Like with the 
dependent variable, an index that combines these shares is created using factor analysis 
since the Pearson correlation coefficients among them are 0.90 or greater.  Obviously, the 
hypothesized sign of this variable should be positive.    
                                                             
3 Since the top 0.01 to 10 percent income shares covered in this paper were all highly correlated (r = 0.9 or more), an 
index of all shares was created using factor analysis, where the factor loadings were all ninety percent or more as well. 
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2. Manufacturing Employment as a Percentage of Overall Employment (US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics).  This variable should be inversely related to the top income shares and 
should have a negative sign since the increase in top income shares has occurred 
simultaneously with a decline in manufacturing employment in the US and the loss of 
high paying manufacturing jobs.  Because of high labor costs, many manufacturing jobs 
were eliminated so as to restore profitability to many US firms, something which should 
help top income shares since these households constitute an investor class more or less.     
3. College Educated as a Percentage of Total Population (US Census Bureau).  The values 
from decennial census years for US educational levels are used to predict the top income 
shares.  This variable is hypothesized to have a positive sign since some writers have 
cited it as a source of the current US income gap—upper income households typically 
have higher levels of education than other income groups, and as a greater percentage of 
the workforce becomes college educated, the income shares of those at the top should 
increase.        
4. Trade Union Membership as a Percentage of the Private Sector Labor Force (US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics).  This is hypothesized to have a positive sign since in other papers 
(mentioned above) declining union membership has been linked to less income for lower 
and middle income groups and more income for upper income groups.   
5. Government expenditures as percentage of GDP (US Bureau of Economic Analysis).  
This is hypothesized to have a negative sign since some previous research has shown this 
to be the case—greater government expenditures help lower and middle income groups to 
the detriment of higher income groups. 
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6. Trade as Percentage of GDP (US Bureau of Economic Analysis).  This is hypothesized to 
have a positive sign based on previous research findings, and for each year, it is the sum 
of the value of total exports and total imports.  Because international trade supposedly 
weakens domestic, working class wages, this should in turn raise the income share of the 
top income strata according to the works mentioned above. 
7. Net Operating Surplus (NOS) as a Percentage of Wages and Salaries (US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis).  Private sector net operating surplus is divided by wages and 
salaries in order to come up with a variable that is somewhat akin to a rate of exploitation 
variable from Marxian economics as mentioned above.  It is hypothesized to have a 
positive value since higher rates of exploitation should lead to higher top income shares.       
8. Net Operating Surplus (NOS) as a Percentage of GDP (US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis).  If members of the top classes are typically members of an “investor class” and 
if many are also the leaders of or investors in US industry (Stiglitz 2011), then as 
business sector profits rise, so should the incomes of this class, and so the sign is 
hypothesized to positive.   
9. Taxes on Corporate Income & Production as a Percentage of GDP (US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis).  If the top income classes constitute an investor class, then 
increases/decreases on corporate income and production should decrease/increase their 
income shares.  This variable is hypothesized to have a negative sign. 
10.  Wage & Salary Disbursements as a Percentage of GDP (US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis).  According to previous research, as the portion of wages of salaries goes up, 
the income shares of top groups should go down because of decreased business 
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profitability, and vice versa, and so this variable is hypothesized to have a negative sign 
as well. 
11. Percentage Annual Change in GDP (US Bureau of Economic Analysis).  As mentioned 
above, greater increases in GDP (or from another way of looking at it, increases in 
productivity) have been linked to greater inequality in recent times, and so this variable is 
hypothesized to have a negative sign.  This is mostly due to the fact that some writers 
believe that labor has not shared in any GDP or productivity increases over the last few 
decades in particular (Dew-Becker and Gordon 2005). 
12.  Top Marginal Rate Individual Income Tax (Saez 2010).  Higher marginal rates cut into   
top income shares, so this variable is hypothesized to have a negative sign. 
13. Regime.  This is a dummy variable wherein the years 1933 to 1980 are coded as “1” and 
correspond to years where social and labor policies were less generous to upper income 
groups, and all other years are coded as “0”, wherein the years 1929 to 1932 correspond 
to pre-New Deal social reforms and the years 1981 to 2008 to the neo-liberal era.   
14. Finance/Insurance/Real Estate (FIRE) Wages and Salaries as a Percentage of all Wage & 
Salaries (US Bureau of Economic Analysis).  Since revenues and value added for these 
industries are not available for all years in the series, this variable is used as a proxy to 
represent the size of these industries in the US economy from 1929 to 2008.  The sign of 
the variable is hypothesized to be positive since previous research has found a significant 
and positive relationship between this variable and top income shares, mostly due to the 
fact that researchers believe that top income groups mostly work and invest in these 
industries.   
11 
 
15.  S / V, Rate of Exploitation of Productive Labor (US Bureau of Economic Analysis).  In 
addition to the other rate of exploitation variable outlined above (NOS/Wages & Salaries 
Percentage) and a working class income share variable (Wages & Salaries / GDP 
Percentage), this variable is used to measure a rate of exploitation using the traditional 
Marxian concepts of productive and unproductive labor.  In general, productive labor is 
essentially the labor that is exploited and whose wages or factor payments appear in the 
denominator of the ratio in equation (1) above.  According to Shaikh and Tonak (1994) 
and Kalmans (1997) it is labor which produces socially useful output, and that, for 
example, would be used in the direct production of goods or services in agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining, construction, transportation, utilities, and personal and social 
services.   Unproductive labor is that which is indirectly involved in the production of 
such items (such as managers, clerical workers, etc.) in such industries as well as those 
working in finance, insurance and real estate, wholesaling, retailing, and business 
services such as advertising and consultancy services.  Because only aggregate wages and 
salaries are given per industry and there is no breakdown between unproductive and 
productive labor pay within each industry in the early decades of the time series analyzed 
in this paper, this paper uses the total of wages and salaries for the productive industries 
in the denominator of S/V.  For the numerator, GDP minus the wages and salaries of the 
productive industries is used as the total of the economy’s surplus value.  These 
components of the ratio create a measure similar to that employed by Shaikh and Tonak 
(1994) and Kalmans (1997) in their analyses of surplus value. 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables.  Some variables, such as the 
top marginal tax rate had higher values until the 1980s when tax rates were lowered whereas other 
12 
 
variables had lower values until the 1980s such as international trade as a percentage of GDP 
(something which became larger as trade barriers increasingly fell that decade and subsequent 
decades).   
Table 2 shows some potential problems with multicollinearity among many of the 
independent variables if one uses the criteria of a Pearson correlation coefficient of an absolute 
value of 0.70 or greater among two independent variables (Anderson, Sweeny, and Williams 2008, 
page 644).  Therefore, a series of models are used and compared in which multicollinearity among 
the independent variables is avoided.  This is a method recently employed by Roine, Vlachos, and 
Waldenstrom (2009) in their analysis of the top income shares of OECD nations.   
(Insert Tables 1 and 2 around here) 
(Insert Figures 1 to 4 around here) 
Results and Discussion 
     Figures 1 to 4 illustrate some of the key variables used in this paper.  Figure 1 shows that the 
income shares of the top 0.01 to 10 percent mostly declined during and after the Great Depression 
until the end of the 1970s.  Beginning in the 1980s, neo-liberal policies of deregulation, slower 
government growth, and lower taxes were implemented in the US, which many writers credit with 
the beginning of a period of rising inequality in the US (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; Foster and 
Magdoff 2009; Kotz 2003, 2008, 2009; Lapavitsas 2009; McNally 2009; Roine, Vlachos, and 
Waldenstrom 2009; Kotz and McDonough 2010; Tabb 2010a and 2010b; Congressional Budget 
Office 2011).  Figure 2 shows a similar pattern to Figure 1 and shows net operating surplus as a 
percentage of GDP falling slowly during and after the Great Depression, and then somewhat picking 
up in the 1980s, although the uptick after the 1970s in Figure 2 is not as great as those in Figure 1.  
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Wages and salaries as a percentage of GDP in Figure 3 only varies between around 45 to 55% from 
1929 to 2008, with the highest percentages occurring before the late 1970s.  Figure 4 mirrors more 
closely those of Figure 1—an overall and gradual decline in one measure of the rate of exploitation, 
NOS/Wages & Salaries %, during and after the Great Depression and up through the end of the 
1970s, and then a gradual, overall increase during the 1980s and onward.  Finally, Figure 5 shows 
another measure of the rate of exploitation, S/V, Rate of Exploitation of Productive Labor, declining 
up to and through the 1960s rather than the 1970s and trending upwards after the 1960s until 2001, 
when a dip occurs, probably due to the 2001 recession.  However, the rate of exploitation begins to 
go back up after 2001.  Because the denominator in S/V is composed of the wages and salaries of 
workers in the manufacturing, transportation, construction and other industries deemed productive, 
perhaps S/V bottoms out somewhere in the 1960s because this decade and the 1950s would be two 
decades where manufacturing employment was at its highest as a portion of overall US employment 
(Congressional Budget Office 2004).   Afterwards, manufacturing as a share of overall employment 
began to decline, which would cause the ratio S/V to go up, all else held constant.   
 The figures seem to support the notion that some type of exploitation has played a role in 
gains to the top groups in addition to increases in NOS as a percentage of GDP, although the latter 
variable never got back up to its pre-1960s levels after trending upward again in the 1970s.  One 
inference from looking at the graphs is that perhaps gains to the top have come more from taking a 
greater share of national income from other groups and not so much from gains coming through 
private sector success or profitability.   However, only multivariate analysis can yield more solid 
conclusions, and this is explored next. 
(Insert Table 3 around here) 
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 The models shown in Table 3 were chosen so as to have combinations of independent 
variables that do not result in any multicollinearity.   Those variables which did not show any 
multicollinearity with any of the other independent variables show up in all eleven models, whereas 
others are rotated.   All the models avoid multicollinearity thanks to rotating certain variables, and 
they also avoid autocorrelation or serial correlation—all tests for autocorrelation yield Durbin-
Watson statistics greater than the upper tail cutoffs for the Durbin-Watson test statistic using 
significance levels of α< 0.05 or α < 0.01 (Studenmund 1992, pages 642-645; Anderson, Sweeney 
and Williams 2008, pages 732-736).   All models have a high degree of explanatory power with 
adjusted r-squares of 0.85 or more, which is not an unusual finding with time series data. 
 In all models, the one-year lag of the top shares is statistically significant and has its 
hypothesized sign (positive).  Most of the independent variables are statistically significant to one 
degree or another in predicting top income shares and have their hypothesized signs.  Some 
exceptions are the yearly percentage change in GDP, which does not work in any of the models, the 
variable Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, which only works in Model 11 and is 
only significant at the α < 0.10 level, and the variable Tax on Corporate Income and Production as a 
Percentage of GDP which is used in Model 6 but is not statistically significant.    
 Models 1 to 4 show that the smaller the percentage employed in manufacturing, the greater 
the percentage of college educated in the workforce, the smaller the percentage belonging to unions, 
and the greater the volume of trade as a percentage of GDP, the greater the income shares of those of 
the top.  Models 8, 9 and 10 also support previous research and assertions that those at the top have 
gained due to lower marginal individual income taxes, the growth of the finance, insurance, and real 
estate industries, and the policies of neo-liberalism (see Regime variable).   
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For the main variables of interest in this paper, the variable NOS as a percentage of GDP 
works in both Models 5 and 11 although the sign of the variable in Model 5 is the reverse of what is 
hypothesized.  Therefore, the hypothesis that the top get some of their income share due to business 
profitability or success is only partially supported since the regression results give mixed results.  
The variable wages as a percentage of GDP works well and has its hypothesized sign in Model 7, the 
only model in which it is used because it is highly correlated with other variables.  The variable 
NOS/Wages and Salaries is used in eight models, and is statistically significant in two of the eight 
and has its predicted sign.  Finally, the variable S/V, Rate of Exploitation of Productive Labor, is 
used in Model 11 and has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant.   Because the 
denominator of S/V includes wages of the manufacturing industry, which has suffered many job 
losses over the last few decades, and because the pay of other industries included in the denominator 
(construction, transportation, utilities, etc.) have traditionally been a major source of pay for the US 
working class, it is not surprising that S/V works well since it has elements of the variables 
Manufacturing Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment, Trade Union Membership, and 
Wages and Salaries as a Percentage of GDP.   
Conclusion 
Most of the writings reviewed for developing this paper explained the growth in the income 
shares of the top income groups by using traditional measurements of manufacturing employment, 
labor income share, trade union membership as well as other macroeconomic variables mentioned 
above.  None, however, used any profitability measures such as Net Operating Surplus or a measure 
of exploitation, such as S/V or NOS/Wage & Salaries Percentage.   The profitability measure shows 
mixed results and the exploitation measures show mixed results as well (these variables work in 3 of 
9 models).  Considering these with the labor income share variable (Wages & Salaries as a 
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Percentage of GDP) and the Trade Union Membership as Percentage of Private Sector Employment 
variable, the argument that income shares are class and politically derived seems to have some 
support.   
On the other hand, those who argue that top income shares are based on the productivity of 
the upper classes due to their educational levels (College Educated as a Percentage of the Population 
variable) or to their involvement in the FIRE industries (FIRE Wages & Salaries as a Percentage of 
Total Wages & Salaries variable), or trade openness (Trade as a Percentage of GDP),  or due to the 
profitability of the private sector (NOS/GDP %) also find some support from the results of this 
paper.  However, some research has found no connection between the pay of top corporate leaders 
and the performance of their organizations (Collins 2001; Economist 2012), and some argue that 
many college educated workers are underemployed, and therefore many of them may be exploited 
workers and not necessarily part of the top income strata (Vaisey 2006; Matgouranis 2010).  Further 
research needs to be done on the contention that a greater percentage of college grads contribute to 
greater income shares at the top.  If many college graduates are underemployed due to their 
oversupply, then this would possibly suggest that some portion of the top income shares are due not 
so much to the greater productivity, and hence earnings, of those with college degrees but to well-
educated labor being in low paying jobs, wherein their human capital is not earning adequate returns, 
which instead could be captured by their employers.      
Whereas the income tax variables (corporate and individual) do not show statistically 
significant results at the α < 0.05 level, the regime variable is statistically significant, which 
demonstrates that income shares can be linked to how favorable or unfavorable political regimes are 
to the top income strata.  Political dimensions seem to matter as much as those as economic factors. 
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Although the results of this note bolster arguments to one degree or another that top income 
shares are earned, and at the same time support the opposite view, that they are extracted from lower 
classes, the findings make a contribution to the literature by using different measurements of 
exploitation to predict with some success top income shares.  In most mainstream writings, the 
concept of exploitation is mostly ignored with the exception of looking at how working class wages 
have declined and can be used to predict measures of inequality such as Gini coefficients as well as 
top income shares (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998, Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Minnich 2003).  The 
Marxian concept of the rate of exploitation appears to have some statistical validity.      
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Table 1--Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
 Top Income Shares Index 0 1.0 
 Lag Top Income Shares Index 0 1.0 
 Manufacturing Employment Pct. 23.298 7.428 
 College Educated Percent 11.408 7.254 
 Trade Union Private Sector Pct. 21.421 10.015 
 Government Expenditure / GDP Pct. 20.492 6.212 
 Trade as Pct. of GDP 14.275 6.807 
 NOS / Wages & Salaries Pct. 50.569 5.832 
 NOS / GDP Pct. 25.030 2.984 
 Taxes on Corporate Income & Production, % of GDP 0.114 0.015 
 Wage & Salary Disbursements as % GDP 49.531 2.221 
 Percentage Annual Change GDP 6.669 7.086 
 Top Marginal Rate Individual Income Tax 0.638 0.227 
 Regime 0.600 0.492  
FIRE Wage & Salaries as Pct. Tot. Wage & Salaries 5.670 1.567 
 S / V,  Rate of Exploitation 3.102 .741 
  n = 80 
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Table 2--Pearson Correlations 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 
Top Income 
Shares Index 
r 
1 .946 -.594 .484 -.761 -.377 .540 -.654 .201 -.555 -.684 .697 .710 .454 -.207 -.640 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .074 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .065 .000 
2 
Lag Top Income 
Shares Index 
r 
.946 1 -.509 .397 -.725 -.357 .457 -.616 .289 -.545 -.663 .616 .626 .509 -.222 -.551 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000   .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .048 .000 
3 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
Pct. 
r 
-.594 -.509 1 -.912 .860 .367 -.922 .787 .575 .722 .840 -.941 -.902 .272 .174 .836 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000   .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .015 .122 .000 
4 
College 
Educated Pct. 
r 
.484 .397 -.912 1 -.698 -.101 .956 -.758 -.513 -.651 -.719 .812 .870 -.218 -.017 -.824 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000   .000 .375 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .052 .878 .000 
5 
Trade Union 
Pct. Private 
Sector 
r 
-.761 -.725 .860 -.698 1 .363 -.742 .847 .292 .780 .921 -.920 -.867 .005 .212 .783 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000   .001 .000 .000 .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 .966 .059 .000 
6 
Govt./ GDP Pct. r 
-.377 -.357 .367 -.101 .363 1 -.226 .270 .109 .340 .385 -.454 -.250 -.038 .380 .348 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.001 .001 .001 .375 .001   .044 .016 .338 .002 .000 .000 .026 .740 .001 .002 
7 
Trade as Pct. of 
GDP 
r 
.540 .457 -.922 .956 -.742 -.226 1 -.752 -.484 -.714 -.756 .833 .874 -.169 -.028 -.865 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .044   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .134 .802 .000 
8 
Regime r 
-.654 -.616 .787 -.758 .847 .270 -.752 1 .243 .843 .898 -.855 -.830 -.043 .328 .792 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .016 .000   .030 .000 .000 .000 .000 .703 .003 .000 
9 
NOS / GDP Pct. r 
.201 .289 .575 -.513 .292 .109 -.484 .243 1 .287 .276 -.449 -.355 .930 .170 .251 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.074 .009 .000 .000 .009 .338 .000 .030   .010 .013 .000 .001 .000 .131 .025 
10 
Taxes on 
Corporate 
Income Pct. Of 
GDP 
r 
-.555 -.545 .722 -.651 .780 .340 -.714 .843 .287 1 .852 -.756 -.713 .037 .369 .695 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .010   .000 .000 .000 .742 .001 .000 
11 
Top Marginal 
Rate 
r 
-.684 -.663 .840 -.719 .921 .385 -.756 .898 .276 .852 1 -.896 -.837 -.013 .282 .779 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .013 .000   .000 .000 .912 .011 .000 
12 
FIRE Wage & 
Sal as Pct. GDP 
r 
.697 .616 -.941 .812 -.920 -.454 .833 -.855 -.449 -.756 -.896 1 .931 -.147 -.272 -.823 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   .000 .193 .014 .000 
13 
S / V r 
.710 .626 -.902 .870 -.867 -.250 .874 -.830 -.355 -.713 -.837 .931 1 -.035 -.146 -.873 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .026 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000   .757 .195 .000 
14 
NOS / Wages r 
.454 .509 .272 -.218 .005 -.038 -.169 -.043 .930 .037 -.013 -.147 -.035 1 .168 -.116 
 
  
Sig. 
(2- .000 .000 .015 .052 .966 .740 .134 .703 .000 .742 .912 .193 .757   .137 .303 
30 
 
tailed) 
15 
Pct. Annual 
Chg. GDP 
r 
-.207 -.222 .174 -.017 .212 .380 -.028 .328 .170 .369 .282 -.272 -.146 .168 1 -.016 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.065 .048 .122 .878 .059 .001 .802 .003 .131 .001 .011 .014 .195 .137   .889 
16 
Wages & Salary 
as Pct. GDP 
r 
-.640 -.551 .836 -.824 .783 .348 -.865 .792 .251 .695 .779 -.823 -.873 -.116 -.016 1 
 
  
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .025 .000 .000 .000 .000 .303 .889   
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Table 3--Regression Models 
Dependent Variable is Top Income Shares Index 
 
Model 1 Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .959
a
 .920 .915 .28280 2.032 
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -.562 .408 
 
-1.375 .173 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .707 .066 .716 10.682 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.001 .006 -.007 -.184 .855 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP  -.004 .005 -.027 -.695 .489 
NOS / Wages 2.794 1.006 .167 2.776 .007 
Manufacturing Emp. Pct. -.035 .008 -.268 -4.619 .000 
 
      
 
      
Model 2 Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .956
a
 .913 .908 .29501 1.980 
 Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -.720 .480 
 
-1.502 .137 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .803 .058 .813 13.821 .000 
Govt. Exp. /GDP Pct. -.010 .006 -.062 -1.590 .116 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP -.002 .006 -.014 -.338 .736 
NOS / Wages 1.302 .882 .078 1.477 .144 
College Educated Pct. .023 .006 .172 3.689 .000 
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Model 3 Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .954 .910 .903 .30158 1.776 
 
       Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -.102 .408 
 
-.251 .802 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .735 .080 .744 9.166 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.005 .006 -.034 -.846 .400 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP .000 .006 .002 .057 .955 
NOS / Wages 1.253 .942 .075 1.330 .188 
Trade Union Priv. Sector -.020 .006 -.210 -3.136 .002 
 
 
      
 
      
Model 4 Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .955 .912 .906 .29690 1.945 
 Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -.809 .508 
 
-1.594 .115 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .804 .059 .814 13.618 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.006 .006 -.039 -.983 .329 
Pct. Annual Chg/ GDP -.003 .006 -.019 -.462 .646 
NOS / Wages 1.173 .877 .070 1.337 .185 
Trade as Pct. of GDP .024 .007 .170 3.536 .001 
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Model 5 Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .950 .902 .897 .31214 1.953 
 
       Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .730 .321 
 
2.277 .026 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .951 .041 .963 22.949 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.006 .007 -.038 -.922 .359 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP .005 .005 .034 .850 .398 
NOS / GDP Pct. -.026 .013 -.079 -1.999 .049 
 
       Model 6 Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .948 .899 .892 .31887 1.856 
 
       Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .661 .442 
 
1.495 .139 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .909 .058 .920 15.624 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.007 .007 -.047 -1.108 .272 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP .005 .006 .036 .849 .399 
NOS / Wages -.341 .822 -.020 -.415 .680 
Taxes on Corporate Income & 
Production Pct. GDP 
-3.321 3.336 -.050 -.996 .323 
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Model 7 Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
   .957 .915 .911 .29027 2.013 
 
       Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
  (Constant) 3.756 .902 
 
4.166 .000 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .833 .042 .843 19.982 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.001 .006 -.009 -.234 .815 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP -.003 .005 -.020 -.520 .605 
Wage & Salary as Pct. GDP -.075 .019 -.172 -4.043 .000 
 
       
Model 8 Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .950 .902 .895 .31441 1.821 
 
       Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .329 .389 
 
.845 .401 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .858 .067 .869 12.849 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.006 .007 -.039 -.931 .355 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP .004 .006 .028 .668 .506 
NOS / Wages  .073 .855 .004 .085 .932 
Top Marginal Rate -.004 .002 -.101 -1.770 .081 
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Model 9 Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .952 .906 .899 .30827 1.869 
 
       Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b 
Std. 
Error Beta 
 (Constant) .251 .384 
 
.654 .515 
Lag Top Income Shares Index  .848 .060 .858 14.200 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.008 .006 -.054 -1.335 .186 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP .006 .006 .044 1.071 .288 
NOS / Wages .042 .788 .003 .053 .958 
Regime -.246 .098 -.125 -2.498 .015 
 
       Model 10 Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .961 .924 .919 .27665 1.852 
 
       Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -2.318 .642 
 
-3.608 .001 
Lag Top Income Shares Factor .684 .066 .692 10.411 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. .002 .006 .010 .261 .795 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP .000 .005 -.002 -.041 .967 
NOS / Wages 2.439 .900 .146 2.710 .008 
FIRE Pct. Tot. Wages & Sal. .183 .036 .296 5.062 .000 
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Model 11 Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
  .964 .929 .924 .26812 1.921 
 
       Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. b Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -1.940 .578 
 
-3.359 .001 
Lag Top Income Shares Index .700 .060 .708 11.748 .000 
Govt. Exp. / GDP Pct. -.010 .006 -.061 -1.692 .095 
Pct. Annual Chg. GDP .000 .005 -.002 -.056 .956 
NOS / GDP  .036 .016 .110 2.216 .030 
S / V .401 .076 .300 5.259 .000 
 
        
